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Abstract 
We exploit a rather neglected source of data, The Commercial and Financial Chronicle to shed light on the 
behaviour of daily and weekly exchange rates throughout several interwar hyperinflation episodes, in particular 
the German hyperinflation. The purpose of our analysis is three-fold: firstly, we investigate the consistency of 
exchange rate data by comparing the rates available from this source to those provided by a widely used source, 
Einzig (1937). Secondly, we scrutinize the commentaries offered by The Chronicle to shed light on the impact 
of news on the behaviour of the US dollar/German reichsmark exchange rate over the interwar German 
hyperinflation, and to check whether the narrative analysis provided therein is consistent with formal 
econometric analyses in dating when the probability of monetary reform became significantly different from 
zero. Thirdly, we examine the relationship between the US dollar/German reichsmark spot rate and German 
wholesale prices during the high inflation period of 1923 using data at (nearly) weekly frequency. We find 
evidence of long- run purchasing power parity, consistent with the findings of several extant studies that employ 
monthly data. However, we also show that complete adjustment to purchasing power parity did not appear to 





The properties of economic relationships during the German hyperinflation of the interwar period 
have been the focus of numerous empirical studies which employ exchange rate data. For instance, 
Frenkel (1977, 1979), Abel et al. (1979) and Michael et al. (1994) employed the forward premium as 
a determinant of inflationary expectations or currency substitution in the demand for money. 
Krugman (1977) and Frenkel (1980) investigated the efficiency of the forward rate as a predictor of 
the future spot rate. Frenkel (op. cit.), Taylor and McMahon (1988) and Michael et al. (1997), inter 
alia, examined the validity of purchasing power parity, whilst Webb (1986) investigated the 
relationship between fiscal news and inflationary expectations, employing exchange rate data in his 
analysis. In each of these papers, the source of German exchange rate data was the data appendix in 
Einzig (1937)1, which, in addition to weekly Saturday observations on the London market of the 
                                                          
1Einzig (1937), Appendix 1, pp. 449–481. The weekly quotations for spot and three-month forward exchange rates are for 
each Saturday in the interwar period and were collected from the weekly circular of the Anglo-Portuguese Colonial and 
Overseas Bank.  
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German reichsmark’s spot and forward exchange rates against the Pound sterling, also reports similar 
rates for other currencies2.  
 
Whilst the quotations of the German reichsmark in the 1920s have received considerable attention due 
to the major hyperinflation episode witnessed by the country, the exchange rates of the other 
currencies reported by Einzig (op. cit.) have also been employed by many studies focusing on the 
interwar period (see, for example, Krugman, 1977; Frenkel, 1978; Hansen and Hodrick, 1980; Peel 
and Taylor, 2002 and Hsieh and Romer, 20063). In contrast to the other studies, Smith and Spencer 
(1991), in their analysis of the behaviour of the US dollar/Pound sterling exchange rate in the period 
leading up to UK’s return to the Gold Standard, employed daily data from a different source, namely 
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle (henceforth The Chronicle).    
  
We examined various issues of The Chronicle from the interwar period and found that in addition to 
the US dollar/Pound sterling spot exchange rate series used by Smith and Spencer (op.cit.), it also 
reports several other daily exchange rates against the US dollar. These include: the German 
reichsmark, the Austrian krone, the Hungarian krone and the Polish mark. Consequently, this hitherto 
relatively unexplored data set enables us to investigate the properties of these daily exchange rates 
over the interwar hyperinflation episodes of their respective countries. Furthermore, it allows us to 
address the important issue of whether the different data sets used in the literature provide a consistent 
picture of exchange rate movements during this period.4 In this study, we carry out a formal analysis 
of the US dollar/ German reichsmark Saturday quotations, which are available from both Einzig 
(1937) and The Chronicle, to determine whether they have similar statistical properties. Furthermore, 
we report the results of a similar exercise for the US dollar/Pound sterling exchange rate in Appendix 
A. 
 
In addition to being a comprehensive source of macroeconomic and financial data, The Chronicle, 
which was published weekly, provides commentaries on economic, social and political developments, 
offering a potential rationale for market movements. These commentaries constitute a source of 
documentary evidence on a number of issues that are pivotal to the interpretation of the findings of 
empirical work covering the interwar hyperinflation period. Some of the most relevant commentaries 
are those on monetary reform. For instance, the precise dating of the markets’ anticipation of 
monetary reform plays a key role in determining the appropriate date to truncate the data series in 
                                                          
2The Belgian franc, the French franc, the Dutch guilder, the Italian lira, the Swiss franc and the US dollar. 
3Krugman (1977) investigated the validity of purchasing power parity and the efficiency of the forward exchange market for 
a sample of exchange rates against the US dollar. Hansen and Hodrick (1980) examined the efficiency of the foreign 
exchange market for the exchange rates of the French franc, US dollar and German reichsmark relative to the British pound. 
Frenkel (1978), Peel and Taylor (2002) and Hsieh and Romer (2006) studied covered interest arbitrage between the US and 
the UK. 
4Bernake (2005) and Hsieh and Romer (2006) have raised this point in the context of the US dollar/Sterling pound and US 
dollar/ French franc exchange rate data respectively.  
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empirical investigations of money demand or market efficiency, due to peso problems (see, e.g., 
Flood and Garber, 1980 and 1983; LaHaye, 1985; Casella, 1989). A second issue of interest is 
whether the US dollar/German reichsmark quotations during the later stages of the German 
hyperinflation were notional. That this could have been the case is suggested by the observation in 
Bresciani-Turroni (1937, pp. 126-128) that “Transactions in marks are limited to casual business or to 
speculation”, wrote the Frankfurter Zeitung of November 7th, 1923. […] At New York, (according to 
the correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung), the exchange rate of the paper mark was fixed by a 
small group of speculators who met round a table in a café!”. 
 
Our analysis of the weekly US dollar/ German reichsmark Saturday quotations available from the two 
data sources suggests that they exhibit similar statistical properties and the differences, occurring 
mainly in the later stages of the hyperinflation, can be explained by measurement that was almost 
certainly at different times of the day. Given this finding, we consider in detail the properties of the 
daily changes in the logarithm of US dollar/German reichsmark spot rates. A brief analysis of three 
other exchange rates during the interwar hyperinflation periods in Austria, Hungary and Poland is 
carried out in Appendix B.  Our analysis demonstrates that both days of dramatic depreciation and, 
perhaps surprisingly, appreciation, occurred during the hyperinflation period. We endeavour to relate 
some of these extreme movements to the narrative provided by The Chronicle.    
 
Furthermore, our data set of daily observations, in conjunction with the weekly data on wholesale 
prices reported by Webb (1986) for the year 1923, allows us to analyze the behaviour of the real 
exchange rate in the later stages of the German hyperinflation. Previous studies addressing this topic 
have used monthly data, including earlier, non-hyperinflation, months5. Given our longer data series, 
we are able to estimate a cointegrating regression between exchange rate and wholesale prices solely 
for weeks in 1923. Whilst we find evidence of a long-run equilibrium purchasing power parity 
relationship, we also find significant short- run deviations, a result that validates the decision of Abel 
et al. (1979) to employ both changes in inflation and changes in spot rates in their analysis of money 
demand during the German hyperinflation. 
 
We also analyze the time series properties of the daily rates of change of the US dollar/German 
reichsmark spot rate during the hyperinflation period 18 April 1923 to 10 August 1923, a period 
following the stabilization policy implemented between 21 February and 17 April 1923, and prior to 
                                                          
5Frenkel (1980) employed monthly data for the period February 1921 – August 1923. Taylor and McMahon (1988) used data 
for the period February 1921 to August 1923, and reported a long-run cointegrating relationship consistent with the 
purchasing power parity holding as a long-run equilibrium condition. However, Abel et al (1979, p.99), suggest, on the basis 
of graphical evidence on the ratio of consumer prices to the spot exchange rate that there was “considerable variation in the 
relative price, contrary to some tight purchasing power relationship”.    
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the date at which we identify the probability of monetary reform becoming significant. In this 
analysis, we find evidence of three equilibria, consistent with the model of Evans et al. (2001).   
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section II we examine the properties of the weekly 
Einzig (1937) and Chronicle quotations. In Section III, we illustrate some of the properties of the 
daily US dollar/ German reichsmark exchange rates. Section IV is a narrative section, which reports 
some commentaries retrieved from The Chronicle, in an attempt to shed light on the likelihood of 
monetary reform towards the later stages of the German hyperinflation and on the impact of news on 
the volume of trade in German marks. Section V investigates the validity of purchasing parity during 
the German hyperinflation episode and the time series properties of the exchange rate. Section VI 
offers a brief conclusion. 
 
 
II. Comparisons Between Exchange Rate Data Sets 
 
In order to determine whether exchange rate data from different sources exhibits similar properties we 
examine the weekly exchange rate returns computed as differences in the logarithm of spot rates from 
our two sources, Einzig (1937) and The Chronicle. Furthermore, we also examine the difference 
between the US dollar/ Reichsmark spot rates (in logs) available from the considered sources. For this 
exercise, we use Saturday quotations. Whilst The Chronicle reports the US Dollar/Reichsmark rate, 
the corresponding rates from Einzig (op.cit.) are inferred as cross rates, using the US dollar/Pound and 
the Reichsmark/Pound spot rates available from this source.  
 
Table 1 below reports descriptive statistics for these series over the period 28 May – 24 November 
1923, suggesting that the weekly returns based on the two data sources exhibit very similar sample 
characteristics. We also plot the difference between the logarithms of the exchange rates from the two 
sources in Figure 1. Whilst the maximum and minimum differences are comparatively large, the mean 
of the differences over the sample period is comparatively small at 1.39%. Figure 1 reveals that the 
difference in quotations attained higher values towards the end of the sample, which reflects the 
different timing of quotations during the day in the later stages of the German hyperinflation. To give 
a few examples, some substantive discrepancies have been recorded on 16 January 1923 (-0.139), 6 
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Maximum 0.5754 0.4383 0.5449 
Minimum -3.3159 -3.2342 -0.3509 
Std Deviation 0.4539 0.4415 0.0735 



























































































































































































































To further illustrate the similar properties of the data, we estimated a simple regression between the 
weekly returns computed using the two data sets. The results suggested that the relationship in the 
rates of change of Saturday quotations is a strong one. For example, for the hyperinflation period  
7 July 1922 – 24 November 1923, we obtained:  
 
DLNEIN = -0.0042 + 1.0036 DLNCH                 
                                                                                        (0.0175)      (0.0277) 
?̅?2 = 0.9474 
 
where DLNEIN  denotes the weekly exchange rate returns calculated using Saturday quotations from 
Einzig (1937) and DLNCH  represents weekly returns based on Saturday quotations from The 
Chronicle. Standard errors are in ( ). 
 
We observe that the estimate of the constant is near zero and the slope coefficient is insignificantly 
different from unity. The high correlation between the two exchange rate series is clear from 







































DLNEIN = weekly returns (differences in logarithms) based on US Dollar/Reichsmark Saturday quotations from Einzig 
(1937) 




As a further check on the data sources, we carried out the same exercise for the US dollar/British 
pound exchange rate. The results, which are reported in Appendix A, also show that the two data 
sources are exhibiting very similar properties.  
 
Given the similar properties of the Saturday US Dollar/Reichsmark quotations, in the next section we 
consider in more detail the properties of the daily exchange rate data. 
 
 
III. The Properties of the Daily German Spot Exchange Rates  
 
The sample properties of the daily data are reported in Table 2. This table, together with Figure 3, 
reveals the great volatility exhibited by the daily changes in the spot exchange rate. This feature of the 
data was commented on by Bresciani-Turroni (1937, pp 126-128) quoted in the introductory section 




































































































































































































































DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE DAILY CHANGE IN (LOG) US DOLLAR/REICHSMARK 
QUOTATIONS 
 
Statistics/ Sample 28 May 1921-24 November 1923 1 May 1923 - 24 November 1923 
Mean -0.0336 -0.1105 
Median -0.0067 -0.0714 
Maximum 1.6414 1.6414 
Minimum -2.3026 -2.3026 
Std Deviation 0.1705 0.3244 
Skewness -2.8563 -1.1141 
Kurtosis 61.2697 19.1100 









DAILY RATES OF CHANGE OF US DOLLAR/ REICHSMARK QUOTATIONS 
  















































































































































































































































































































































The Chronicle data does in fact display a pattern which essentially accords with the observations of 
Breciani-Turroni (1937). On April 6th, April 8th, April 11th and April 14th 1923, the quotations in 
Marks per Dollar were 1.8, 5, 3.2 and 2.5 million Reichsmarks per Dollar. As a further indication of 
the volatility, between 16 April and 1 September 1923 there were twenty seven days on which the 
spot rate appreciated with an average of 11.99%. Also, in the period 1 September to 24 November 
1923 there were sixteen days on which the spot rate appreciated with an average of 26.76% and with a 
maximum of 164% and a median of 6.64%.  Of course, these dramatic appreciations could simply 
reflect good news. As stressed by Webb (1986, pp. 769 – 770), “Important fiscal news included not 
only matters narrowly related to the budget, like tax reforms and Allied reparations demands, but also 
challenges to the government’s authority-armed uprisings and foreign invasions”. However, despite 
allowing for a larger connotation for the concept of ‘news’, a la Webb (op. cit.), and its impact on 
exchange rates, the magnitude of the appreciations we detect in the data is still somewhat surprising 
given the dramatic depreciations taking place over the same period6. 
 
Figure 3 (B) shows the impact of the stabilization policy enacted between 21 February and 16 April 
1923, when the Reichsbank intervened in the foreign exchange market in support of the Reichsmark 
exchange rate7.This policy resulted in near constancy of the exchange rate over this period.  
 
                                                          
6 We would note in this context that Hansen and Hodrick (1980) report evidence on the determinants of excessive returns to 
currency holdings that are consistent with inefficiency in the foreign exchange markets in this period. 



















































































































































































































































































IV. The Prospects of Monetary Reform and the Trading in Marks Towards the Final Stages of 
the German Hyperinflation: A Narrative Analysis 
 
Precise dating of when economic agents’ probability of monetary reform ceases to be negligible is 
critical in formal econometric analysis of speculative bubbles or appropriate dating of samples to 
avoid peso problems. Consequently, it is of interest to determine if The Chronicle commentary might 
provide some narrative evidence in support of the formal analysis conducted by Flood and Garber 
(1983) and LaHaye (1985), who investigated econometrically the likelihood of a monetary reform. 
These authors assumed rational expectations and based their estimates of the date of monetary reform 
on estimates of the money supply process. Their analyses suggest that agents had a negligible 
probability of monetary reform having occurred or not expecting it to occur until after mid August 
1923 and varied considerably over the next ten weeks. 
  
By scrutinising the weekly commentaries provided in various issues of The Chronicle (a selection of 
which is included in Box 1 below), we found several salient mentions of monetary reform8. It is 
important to note that the first mention of monetary reform in the Chronicle occurs on 11 August 























                                                          
8 The Chronicle also mentions monetary reform as a possibility on 10 October 1923 for the other countries witnessing 
hyperinflation: “Recent advices from Central Europe are to the effect that a number of the European nations are considering 
the advisability of instituting new currency systems”. Among those mentioned are Austria, Hungary and Poland, each of 








11 August 1923 
 
“Absolute withdrawal of Reichsbank’s regulations in the matter of dealings in mark exchange and rumours that Germany was planning to repudiate the 
mark and restore the Gold currency added to the general confusion and served to still further complicate matters, the result being a series of amazing 
declines in the value of Reichsmark, already close to nil, bringing quotations down to almost infinitesimally low figures” 
 
Week ending 
25 August 1923 
 
“On August 17th the representative in the German capital of the New York Herald said that ‘the Government’s efforts to put German finances upon a 
gold basis have met with a sharp setback’. The New York Tribune correspondent asserted that ‘the Reichsbank still continues to refuse to cooperate 
with the Government in its plan to stabilize the currency” 
 
Week ending 
15 September 1923 
 
“Renewed rumours that the German government is planning to form a new bank of issue which will circulate currency based on gold reserves, and 
probably utterly repudiate the present mark, had a disastrous effect on values and brought about a sharp slump in mark values to a microscopic 
0.00000075 (88,000,000 mark to an US$)” 
 
Week ending 
22 September 1923   
 
“German marks were chiefly influenced by political uncertainties, publication of further details of Chancellor Stresemann’s plan for establishment of a 
gold currency to supersede marks and further colossal additions to the Reichsbank’s note issue” 
 
Week ending 
20 October 1923 
 
“Notwithstanding announcement that the Stresemann government had decided to stop the printing of marks at an early date, last week’s German Bank 
statement recorded a colossal increase in note circulation, nearly quadrupling the total amount outstanding. The next statement is looked forward to 
with considerable interest” 
 
Week ending 
27 October 1923 
 
“It was reported towards the end of the week that the printing of the new gold currency had commenced.  RM sank to still lower depths and the 
quotation (nominal so far as this market is concerned) was reduced to the incredible minute figure of 0.0000000010, the equivalent of 100,000,000,000 
marks for $1” 
 
Week ending 
10 November 1923 
 
“No real improvement is looked for, however, while the Reichsbank’s issue of note circulation continues at its present unparalleled rate. Although at 
the close there was a rally to 0.000000000045. The new Gold-backed German currency is now available, but thus far dealers are displaying caution in 
their handling of rentenmarks” 
 
Week ending 
17 November 1923 
 
“Talk of the formation of a group of leading American banks for the purpose of negotiating a large German loan aroused some attention, but very little 
notice was taken of the announcement that the German authorities had made arrangements to begin the issuance of the new rentenmark on November 
15 and that after that date it would no longer be necessary to meet the needs of the Reichsbank by the printing of paper marks. Bankers here take the 
view that the all important point just at present is adjustment of reparations problems” 
 
Week ending 
24 November 1923 
 
“Very little hope is entertained of bringing about any improvement in German exchange conditions, in the absence of genuine monetary reform. 
Issuance of paper marks on a colossal scale had an unfavourable effect. It is considered impossible for the Government to balance its budget under the 




In addition to comments on economic, social and political events, The Chronicle offers a number of 
comments concerning the volume of trade in Reichsmarks. It would appear from these that trade 
continued in foreign centres (that is outside Germany) after 18 August 1923, but became negligible 
after 8 October 1923, in foreign centres though still continuing; for instance, see in particular the 
comments of August 18th, October 6th and November 10th 1923. The commentary in The Chronicle 
also highlights newsworthy events which are assumed to impact on the exchange rate. Some 
examples, relevant to both issues, are set out below9. 
                                                          




COMMENTARIES ON TRADING ACTIVITY 
Date  Commentary 
 
Week ending 
14 July 1923 
 
“Marks rates were forced down to a new low record, namely 0.0003 ¼ . Subsequently, there was a partial rally and the quotation moved up to 0.0005 ¼ c., on hopes of some 




21 July 1923 
 
“Locally, dealers are exhibiting marked caution in taking on commitments in these exchanges, though some speculative transactions for moderate amounts were recorded. 
Attempts to sell on the part of foreign holders, however, are still in evidence and were responsible for the occasional breaks. The predominating influence is, of course, the 




28 July 1923 
 
“The feature of the week, however, was the further decline in the value of the Reichsmark. Renewed pressure to sell at foreign centres, coupled with the unfavourable effect 
on market sentiment of another phenomenal expansion in note circulation…”  
 
Week ending 
4 August 1923 
 
“Trade was erratic and the undertone nervous and confused. In a word, the market was unusually susceptible to ‘bad’ news and responded to the many unfavourable rumors 
circulating in the financial district by sharp loses in values. This is especially true of Marks, which, as a result of disappointing reparations news, intimations of internal 
political upheaval and a further spectacular expansion in Reichsbank’s note circulation, were forced down to 0.000083. Drastic action of Imperial Bank of Germany in raising 




18 August 1923 
 
“The early weakness of course, reflected re collapse of the Cuno government and the coincident internal political disorders. Subsequently with the suppression of rioting and 
resumption of order, coupled with adoption of a more conciliatory attitude by Chancellor Stresemann, the quotations steadied, and it was claimed that supporting orders were 
put forth for substantial amounts. Bankers and traders alike take an optimistic view of the change in the German cabinet, but are extremely wary in the matter of actual 




25 August 1923 
 
“With receipt of the news of yesterday’s quotation of the mark in New York, showing a decline of 100% in 24 hours, registering a low record, the feeling quickly developed 





“German marks were heavy practically throughout and not only did not respond favourably to rumours of the possibility that France and Germany  might open negotiations 
looking to an agreement in the reparations dispute, but were actually forced down an additional 0.000003 points, to the infinitesimal figure of 0.000010. At this price, a dollar 
would purchase 10,000,000 marks. The decline was attributed mainly to the demoralized financial conditions in Germany, and followed publication of an amazing bank 
statement which showed the largest expansion of note circulation: well over 54 trillion marks. Recent dispatches outlining new measures to protect exchange exercised little 





“As to marks, unabated Reichsbank note expansion coupled with ever-increasing efforts to dispose of the mark holdings completely offset the betterment in the outlook for 





BOX 2 cont’d 
 
Week ending 
15 September 1923 
 
 
“Following recovery at the end of last week at 0.000003, renewed rumours that the German government is planning to form a new bank of issue which will circulate currency 
based on gold reserves, and probably utterly repudiate the present mark, had a disastrous effect on values and brought about a sharp slump in mark values to a microscopic 
0.00000075 (88,000,000 mark to an US$). The mark closed at 0.00000090 after a small recovery. Continued unloading of marks by German interests and still another huge 
expansion in the output of note circulation all combined to force down prices” 
 
Week ending 
22 September 1923 
 
“German marks were chiefly influenced by political uncertainties, publication of further details of Chancellor Stresemann’s plan for establishment of a gold currency to 
supersede marks and further colossal additions to the Reichsbank’s note issue. Advance in German bank rate to 90% manifestly could not serve to arrest the decline in mark 
quotations, which were forced down to the infinitesimal figure of 0.00000035, another new low record, and approximately 285,712,000 marks to the dollar. (as mark 
remained weak at 0.00000035, equivalent to 285,712,000 marks to 1 US$) Subsequently Mark rallied back to 0.00000100 wholly on the speculative buying by German 
interests hopeful of a speedy agreement with France”  
 
Week ending 
29 September 1923 
 
“RMs did not respond as readily to improved prospects of settlement of Germany’s reparation difficulties and after weakness in the early dealings, the grotesquely low 
quotation recovered 0.00000042 points to 0.00000100. Later the quotation sagged off again to 0.00000049, but it subsequently seemed as if the German government had 
resumed support of the mark to relieve the growing tension in Germany over the complete collapse of mark values, which it was feared might lead to overthrow of the 
Stresemann regime.”  
 
Week ending 
6 October 1923 
 
 “Indications of another political upheaval in Berlin for a while aroused widespread alarms and the mark values were again attacked, further progress being made in the 
process of complete devaluation. The quotation at one time was down to the infinitesimal figure of 0.00000018, a loss of 0.00000042 points. At this level, over 400,000,000 
marks could have been purchased for a dollar, though so far as the local market is concerned , the quotation carried no meaning whatsoever, since the German exchange is 
not being dealt in. At London and other financial centres in Europe distress offerings of marks continue to be made with very few takers even at the most extreme 
concessions”. .           
 
Week ending 
20 October 1923 
 
“Developments regarding the reparations tangle and Chancellor Streseman’s efforts to restore some semblance of political order in Germany were factors of considerable 
importance, but probably the most potent influence in deciding actual values was the volume of commercial bills offering.  RMs failed to reflect the more hopeful utterances 
from Berlin earlier in the week, and after a while broke severely on what appeared to be another serious political upheaval in Germany. In the late dealings the whole foreign 
exchange market firmed up on more cheerful reports from abroad, which included the French, British and Italian agreement to use Belgium’s reparation plan as propounded 
in June for the basis of a new plan of settlement with Germany, resumption of work in many parts of the Ruhr and indications of subsistence of rioting in Berlin and other 
important German centres. Notwithstanding announcement that the Stresemann government had decided to stop the printing of marks at an early date, last week’s German 
Bank statement recorded a colossal increase in note circulation, nearly quadrupling the total amount outstanding. The next statement is looked forward to with considerable 
interest.. RMs finished at 0.000000085 for both checks and cable transfers, against 0.00000002 the previous week.” 
 
Week ending 
10 November 1923 
 
 “While very little business in marks is being done locally, it is understood that in London and the continent there is still a demand for marks, largely from speculative 
interests who believe that pre-war currency will be recognized in the final readjustment of currency. No real improvement is looked for, however, while the Reichsbank’s 
issue of note circulation continues at its present unparalleled rate. Although at the close there was a rally to 0.000000000045” 
    
 
Week ending 
17 November 1923 
 
“RMs were adversely affected not only by the hitch in the reparations program, but by the reports that the German government was about to repudiate the Versailles Treaty 
and also to declare an autonomous Rhineland state. Various conflicting reports as to the progress of events caused considerable backing and filling and prices fluctuated 
erratically, with the extremes 0.000000000044 and 0.000000000015, figures that are virtually worthless so far as actual transactions in this market are concerned. Talk of the 
formation of a group of leading American banks for the purpose of negotiating a large German loan aroused some attention, but very little notice was taken of the 
announcement that the German authorities had made arrangements to begin the issuance of the new rentenmark on Nov 15 and that after that date it would no longer be 
necessary to meet the needs of the Reichsbank by the printing of paper marks. Bankers here take the view that the all important point just at present is adjustment of 
reparations problems”  
 
Week ending 
24 November 1923 
 
“RMs shared in the general weakness, but changes in the nominal and meaningless quotations were comparatively small, and the range for the week was 0.000000000015 to 
0.000000000020. No dealings in this class of currency were reported locally, but it is claimed that selling is still attempted abroad. Very little hope is entertained of bringing 
about any improvement in German exchange conditions, in the absence of genuine monetary reform. Issuance of paper marks on a colossal scale had an unfavourable effect. 
It is considered impossible for the Government to balance its budget under the present abnormal situation. Intimations that the use of the new rentenmark is increasing rapidly 




V.  Purchasing Power Parity in 1923 Employing Near- weekly Sampled Data and the Time 
Series Properties of the Spot Exchange Rate 
 
We employ the natural logarithm of the wholesale price index retrieved from the percentage changes 
in this index reported in Webb (1986, Table 3 for four dates of each month) and the natural logarithm 
of the US dollar/German reichsmark spot exchange rates (from The Chronicle) corresponding to the 
dating of the wholesale price data10 over the period 30 December 1922 – 7 August 1923, terminating 
the period prior to agents’ probability of monetary reform becoming significant. The values of the 
proxy for the real exchange rate values are then calculated as the difference in these two variables; 
given that the monthly US wholesale price index did not exhibit much variation and was stationary, its 
omission from the relationship is only of qualitative significance. 
  
We normalize our proxy for the logarithm of the real exchange rate at the end of December 1922. 








                                                          
10 The changes in the wholesale price index employed here are calculated as chain values, with reference to the previous date 




















































































































































In Model 1 below we report the regression between the logarithm of the spot exchange rate and the 
logarithm of wholesale prices. This can be interpreted as a cointegrating regression since both series 
are non-stationary. The slope coefficient is estimated as near unity. The residuals from the regression 
pass diagnostic tests for stationarity. When we impose a unit coefficient, we also can reject non-
stationarity. Consequently, given the obvious caveats regarding the relatively short data span, 
purchasing power parity appears to hold as a long-run condition of this high inflation period as well as 
the longer period analysed by Taylor and McMahon (1988) using monthly data. In Model 2 we report 
a significant first- order autoregressive structure in the real exchange rate, which illustrates a rather 
incomplete adjustment of the spot rate to the wholesale price level.  However, the autoregressive 
coefficient raised to the power four suggests near complete adjustment within one month albeit with a 
large stochastic noise. These results offer support to the analysis of Abel et al (1979, p99) in 
employing both inflation and changes in spot rates as determinants of the opportunity cost of holding 
money.  
 
Over the period 18 April to 9 August 1923, following the stabilization policy enacted in Germany 
between 21 February and 17 April 1923, and prior to the date at which we identify the probability of 
no monetary reform becoming significantly different from unity11 there are 97 daily observations of 
the spot exchange rate. Whilst this is a relatively short sample, analysis of the time series properties of 
the spot rate during this hyperinflation period appears of interest.  Daily percentage rates of change 
over this period appear stationary12 and a random linear process in mean can be detected though 
exhibiting significant ARCH effects13. The analysis of hyperinflation episodes conducted by Sargent 
and Wallace (1973) revealed that the assumption that the authorities finance a given real budget 
deficit by printing money implies that inflation  will follow a  non-linear process which can exhibit 
two equilibria, the stabilities of which depend upon the process determining expectations. Evans et al. 
(2001) extend the analysis to a model embodying heterogeneous expectations of inflation. They 
demonstrate that with adaptive learning and for a wide range of parameter values, there can exist three 
equilibria, of which two can be stable including the high inflation equilibria.  The ESTAR non-linear 
model can exhibit up to three equilibria and consequently is a prime candidate for analyzing the daily 
rates of change of the spot rate. In model 3 below we report the estimates of an ESTAR model. The 
most parsimonious model of the conditional mean is estimated jointly with a component ARCH (1,1) 
model assuming a generalized error distribution. The residuals or standardized residuals from the 
estimated model are free from significant serial correlation or ARCH effects on the basis of LM tests 
of any relevant order.  
 
                                                          
11 In line with the conclusion that “the probability of no reform is essentially unity prior to mid-August 1923” (LaHaye, 
1985, footnote 18).   
12 As illustrated by a Dickey-Fuller test statistic of -8.92. 
13 As illustrated by a p-value for the LM-ARCH test of order 4 of 0.001. 
17 
 
The estimated ESTAR model in this hyper inflation period exhibits  three equilibria, with the point 
estimates of the parameter values giving estimates of the steady state  rates of depreciation  as -78.5%. 
-84.18 and -89.5% per day. Stability analysis reveals that the lower and higher equilibria are stable 
with the middle one being unstable.  Whilst the analysis is based on relatively few observations, with 
all the usual caveats, given that the equilibria are close together, this analysis is suggestive that the 
spot rate over this period would ultimately depreciate by around seventy eight to eighty nine percent 
in the absence of shocks.   
 
Model 1: The regression of the log of the nominal US dollar/Reichsmark exchange rate (LGEEX) on 
the log of the German wholesale price index, LGEWPI, over the period 30 December 1922 –7 August 
1923  
 
LGEEX = 0.11 + 1.027 LGEWPI                      
                (0.07)     (0.032)  
R̅2 = 0.977  
DW=0.89 
 
Model 2:   The regression of the log of the real US dollar/Reichsmark exchange rate (LGEREX) on its 
first lag (LGEREX(-1)) over the period 30 December 1922 –7 August 1923  
 
LGEREX = 0.09 + 0.51 LGEREX(-1) 
                       (0.05)     (0.17)  
?̅?2 = 0.25  
DW = 1.68  
ARCH(1) LM test p-value = 0.94 
  
     
Model 3:   ESTAR model of conditional mean for daily percentage changes in the logarithm of the 
nominal exchange rate (DLGEEX) over the period  18 April 1923  to 9 August  1923  
 
DLGEEX= - 84.17+2.01[DLGEEX (-1) + 84.17]∙ 𝑒−0.0001∙(14.48)
2∙(𝐷𝐿𝐺𝐸𝐸𝑋 (−1)+84.18)2                         
 
?̅?2 = 0.15  
DW = 1.6214    
                                                          
14ARCH and serial correlation LM tests for the residuals for the jointly estimated component ARCH(1,1) model  reject  the 
hypothesis of significant t serial correlation or ARCH at all normal significance levels. 14.48 is the standard deviation of 
daily percentage changes in the spot rate. 
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VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
The Chronicle provides a neglected source of data on the behaviour of daily exchange rates 
throughout several interwar hyperinflation episodes15. This is complemented by extensive weekly 
market commentaries. Building on these considerations, in this paper we first examined whether The 
Chronicle quotations exhibited similar statistical properties to those of the weekly data from Einzig 
(1937). Our statistical analysis for both the US dollar/Reichsmark and the US dollar/British pound16 
exchange rates showed that this was the case. We then investigated further the statistical properties of 
the daily exchange rate series. We observed that the German currency exhibited numerous days of 
large appreciations in the midst of dramatic depreciations; this feature is not apparent in the weekly 
Einzig data. Similar properties, albeit in the presence of much lower volatility, are observed during 
the Austrian, Hungarian and Polish hyperinflations, analysed in Appendix B of this paper.  
 
To shed light on the impact of economic and social events and news on the behaviour of the US 
dollar/German reichsmark exchange rate over the interwar German hyperinflation, we examined the 
comprehensive commentary provided by The Chronicle. This commentary offers documentary 
evidence of two important issues. First, the commentary is consistent with the formal econometric 
analysis of Flood and Garber (1980, 1983) and LaHaye (1985) in dating when the probability of 
monetary reform became significant, namely mid-August 1923. Second, the commentary suggests 
that there was a sufficient volume of trade in German currency, certainly in non-German centres to 
regard the quotes in Einzig (1937) or The Chronicle as more than simply notional until late November 
1923. 
 
Using the daily quotes from The Chronicle and the four- time monthly sampled wholesale price data 
from Webb (1986) we examined the relationship between the US dollar/German reichsmark spot rate 
and German wholesale prices during the high inflation period of 1923. We found evidence of long- 
run purchasing power parity, consistent with the findings of several extant studies employing monthly 
data for the period 1922-1923. However, we also showed that complete adjustment to purchasing 
power parity did not appear to occur with the nearly-weekly sampled data. 
  
An analysis of daily percentage changes in the spot rate over the later stages of the German 
hyperinflation suggested this series followed a nonlinear process that was consistent and which 
exhibited stable long-run steady state depreciation rates of between seventy eight and eighty nine 
percent. 
 
                                                          
15 The data set employed in this paper is available from the authors upon request.  





We complement the analysis carried out in Section II of the paper with a similar exercise. W examine 
weekly logarithmic changes and the difference in weekly quotations (computed as differences in the 
natural logarithms of the spot rates) of another exchange rate extensively used in empirical studies 
that focused on the 1920s, the US dollar/British pound rate. We compare the Saturday quotations for 
this exchange rate available from two sources: Einzig (1937) and The Chronicle, as compiled by 
Smith and Spencer (1991). 
 
Table A1 below reports several descriptive statistics for these series, suggesting that the weekly 




DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR US DOLLAR/ BRITISH POUND QUOTATIONS 
 
Sample: 6 May 1922 - 29 December 1923  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Weekly returns based 
on Einzig (1937) 
 
Weekly returns based 
on The Chronicle 
 
The difference in 
weekly  (Saturday) 
quotations between 
Einzig and The 
Chronicle 
 
Mean -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 
Median -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0001 
Maximum 0.0168 0.0194 0.0043 
Minimum -0.0207 -0.0234 -0.0078 
Std Deviation 0.0057 0.0061 0.0013 
Skewness -0.1857 -0.2431 -1.5776 
Kurtosis 5.2298 6.1824 16.77769 
 
The figures for the maximum and minimum differences and the mean of the difference over the 
sample period, which is very small, provide evidence in support of consistency of the data from the 



















COMPARISON OF THE DIFFERENCE OF WEEKLY (SATURDAY) LOGARITHMIC 




Notes: LNEINDP = US dollar/British pound Saturday quotations (in logs) from Einzig (1937)  
LNCHRDP = US dollar/British pound Saturday quotations (in logs) from The Chronicle 
 
To further illustrate the similar properties of the data, we estimate a simple regression between the 
logarithms of the two quotations. The results, reported below, show that The Chronicle data is an 
unbiased and efficient predictor of Einzig’s (1937) data. The Saturday quotes for the US 
Dollar/British pound from the two sources usually only differ in the third decimal point.  
 
LNEINDP = 0.003 + 0.998 LNCHRDP 
(0.009)   (0.006) 
?̅?2 = 0.997 
DW = 1.87 
 


















































































































































































Other European Interwar Hyperinflations: Austria, Hungary and Poland 
 
This section focuses on three other episodes of post-World War I hyperinflation, namely those 
witnessed by Austria, Hungary and Poland. These had been covered in the pioneering study of Cagan 
(1956). Fischer et al. (2002) date these hyperinflations as follows: Austria: October 1921- August 




Figure A2.1 below illustrates the daily changes in the US dollar/Austrian krone exchange rate during 
the hyperinflation episode October 1921- August 192217. These are complemented by a set of 
descriptive statistics provided in Table A2.The movements in the Austrian crone’s exchange rate 
against the US Dollar have not been as erratic as those recorded by the German reichsmark. Out of the 
277 observations considered here, 157 correspond to a depreciation of the Austrian krone, whilst 120 
record an appreciation on a daily basis. October 1921 has been a month of extreme volatility, with 
sequences of appreciations and depreciations: for instance, October 18 - October 19, when the crone 
appreciated by 17% during one day. Substantive depreciations of the crone occurred on 3 November 
1921, 13 June 1922 (22.31%), 1 August 1922 (24.11%) and 2 August 1922 (25.78%). Major 
















                                                          
17 The available data starts at the end of May 1921, but here we chose to focus on the hyperinflation period (October 1921-




DAILY RATES OF CHANGE IN THE US DOLLAR/AUSTRIAN KRONE EXCHANGE RATE 




DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE DAILY RATE OF CHANGE OF THE US 
DOLLAR/AUSTRIAN KRONE (DAUST), THE US DOLLAR/HUNGARIAN KRONE (DHUNG), 



















Mean -0.0133 -0.0081 -0.0191 
Median -0.0075 0.0000 0.0000 
Maximum 0.2111 0.2429 0.1541 
Minimum -0.2578 -0.6678 -0.3198 
Std Deviation 0.0575 0.0551 0.0693 
Skewness -0.2642 -5.6618 -0.9644 
















































































































































































































The biggest daily depreciation was recorded on 26 July 1923 (66.78%). Out of 296 daily changes 
observed during the hyperinflation episode considered here, 105 correspond to depreciations, with the 
remaining 191 witnessing either no changes in the value of the Hungarian crone or occasional 
appreciations.   
 
FIGURE A2.2 
DAILY RATES OF CHANGE IN THE LOG US DOLLAR/HUNGARIAN KRONE EXCHANGE 






Over the 1-year period that Sahay et al (2002) highlight as the Polish hyperinflation episode (January 
1923-January 1924), the value of the Polish mark against the US dollar depreciated by 99.8%. Out of 
327 daily changes recorded over the period under scrutiny here, 141 correspond to depreciations, with 
the largest daily depreciation having been recorded on 27 October 1923 (31.98%). The biggest daily 




































































































































































































































DAILY RATES OF CHANGE IN THE LOG US DOLLAR/POLISH MARK EXCHANGE RATES 
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